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The field of social neuroscience has made considerable progress in unraveling the
neural correlates of human cooperation by making use of brain imaging methods.
Within this field, neuroeconomic research has drawn on paradigms from experimental
economics, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Trust Game. These paradigms
capture the topic of conflict in cooperation, while focusing strongly on outcome-related
decision processes. Cooperation, however, does not equate with that perspective, but
relies on additional psychological processes and events, including shared intentions and
mutually coordinated joint action. These additional facets of cooperation have been
successfully addressed by research in developmental psychology, cognitive science, and
social philosophy. Corresponding neuroimaging data, however, is still sparse. Therefore, in
this paper, we present a juxtaposition of these mutually related but mostly independent
trends in cooperation research. We propose that the neuroscientific study of cooperation
could benefit from paradigms and concepts employed in developmental psychology and
social philosophy. Bringing both to a neuroimaging environment might allow studying the
neural correlates of cooperation by using formal models of decision-making as well as
capturing the neural responses that underlie joint action scenarios, thus, promising to
advance our understanding of the nature of human cooperation.
Keywords: cooperation, stag hunt, game theory, joint action, joint attention, neuroeconomics, shared
intentionality, we-mode
Human cultural knowledge and social institutions are unique
features that cannot be found in other species. Without con-
tinuous cooperative efforts among humans, there were no such
things as cars, computers, or algebra. Neither would human
beings get married, earn money, vote for presidents or bring
about Beethoven’s ninth symphony. To cooperate, according to
Webster’s Third International Dictionary (Gove and Merriam-
Webster Inc., 2002), means (1) to work with another or others
toward a common end, (2) to act together, and (3) to associate
with another or others for mutual (often economic) benefit. The
Collins Cobuild Dictionary (1995) additionally highlights that
to cooperate entails a willingness to help one’s collaborators.
Following this common sense definitions, for the current pur-
poses, we will rely on a working definition of cooperation that
includes the following three aspects: (1) acting together to pursue
a common goal, (2) striving for mutual benefits, and (3) being
willing and able to maintain cooperative activities and remedy
problems if necessary.
The aim and object of this paper consists in the attempt
to discuss human cooperation from the perspectives of differ-
ent scientific disciplines. We will first briefly review exemplary
empirical evidence and concepts on cooperation in anthropology,
economics, behavioral psychology, developmental and compar-
ative psychology, as well as philosophy. We then go on to eval-
uate how much those disciplines have contributed so far to
the burgeoning field of neuroeconomics. Finally, we will sug-
gest and comment on possible future avenues of an intensified
multi-disciplinary approach to cooperation research and pos-
sible refinements in methodology that could help research in
this area.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN COOPERATION
Advanced forms of cooperation are rare in non-primate
species (Dunbar, 1993) and probably emerged in non-human
primates several million years ago (Cosmides and Tooby,
2005). Increasingly sophisticated social-cognitive capabilities
seem indispensable preconditions for the development of more
advanced cooperative skills in non-human primates, such as
alliance formation and conjoint hunting (Boesch and Boesch,
1989; Boesch, 1994; Boesch and Tomasello, 1998). In particu-
lar, primatologists believe that frequent and targeted grooming
is an efficient means to facilitate coalition formation (Barrett and
Henzi, 2005). Reconciliation is another example of the advanced
social skills of non-human primates necessary for maintaining
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cooperative long-term relationships with genetically unrelated
conspecifics. The uniquely human ability to contemplate others’
thoughts, desires, and intentions (i.e., theory of mind) is likely
to have paved the way for the development of the sophisti-
cated social skills of humans, such as language and pedagogy
(Tomasello, 1999; Csibra andGergely, 2009; Frith and Frith, 2010;
Csibra and Gergely, 2011). The ensuing ubiquitous and uniquely
complex cooperative activities of humans entailed a cumulative
cultural evolution and allowed for the emergence of large-scale
phenomena, such as nations or the internet.
From a neurobiological perspective, accumulating evidence
suggests that the comparatively large human brain did not evolve
driven mainly by the need to explore and exploit the inert
physical environment, but much rather the dynamic social envi-
ronment (Humphrey, 1976). In support of this “social brain
hypothesis,” the relative size of the neocortex in primates sta-
tistically correlates with the complexity of their social systems,
that is, the social group or grooming clique size, the frequency
of coalitions, and strategic deception (Dunbar, 1993; Dunbar
and Shultz, 2007). This suggests important selection pressures
for neural circuits that decode and assess social information
efficiently and reliably. For instance, neural mechanisms for rec-
ognizing and punishing free riders (i.e., individuals misusing
others’ cooperative tendencies) are crucial for expelling harm-
ful individuals from the group and hence ensuring cooperation.
Mutual social exchange, on the other hand, is evidently bene-
ficial for survival as economic problems may be jointly solved,
i.e., hunting prey, defending oneself against predators, or breed-
ing collectively (Burkart et al., 2009; Hrdy, 2009). Therefore, a
propensity to cooperate might be speculated to improve, evo-
lutionarily speaking, survival in a group context (Sober and
Wilson, 1999; Bacharach et al., 2006), and could be assumed
to, neurobiologically speaking, be driven by activity in reward-
related neurocircuits.
NEUROECONOMICS AND SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
Neuroeconomics has emerged as a multi-disciplinary field in
which psychologists, biologists, economists, and neuroscientists
join their efforts to investigate the neural basis of decision-making
processes that come into play during social interaction. In this
context, “social” neuroeconomics have employed paradigms that
are often borrowed from behavioral game theory, which pro-
vides formal accounts of strategic interaction. As a consequence,
cooperation has been mainly construed in a way that empha-
sizes decision-processes involved in social interactions associated
with explicit payoffs. Among the multitude of games game the-
ory employs for describing such interactions, especially social
dilemma games such as the Prisoner’s Dilamma (PD), social
exchange games, such as the Trust Game, and fairness games, such
as the UltimatumGame constitute key tasks in recent neuroimag-
ing studies of cooperation (for a more detailed background see
Figure 1).
These economic games and related psychological constructs
such as trust, social preferences, have been used in conjunction
with different research methods: behavioral experiments, neuro-
logical lesion studies (e.g., in the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex), transient TMS lesion (Knoch et al., 2006), pharmacological
manipulation, e.g., Oxytocin, (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Baumgartner
et al., 2008), and functional neuroimaging (King-Casas et al.,
2005). Moreover, healthy subjects were compared with subjects
suffering from psychiatric conditions, e.g., autism-spectrum dis-
order (Sally and Hill, 2006), borderline-personality disorders

















































FIGURE 1 | Overview of most commonly employed economic games in
social neuroscience. Panel (A) depicts the Prisoner’s Dilemma in its general
form according to which the following relation holds: T > R > P > S. The
Prisoner’s Dilemma involves a decision problem in which individuals can
either maximize their own payoff, while potentially harming the co-player, or
maximize both players’ joint payoff at the risk of significant monetary loss
given the possibility that the other does not cooperate. Consequently, it is
also called a mixed-motive game and qualifies excellently for investigating the
conditions for self-versus socially oriented decisions in cooperation. Panel (B)
gives an example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s pay-off contingencies. Panel (C)
schematically depicts the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982). Here, players
have to balance own and the other’s payoffs. One player receives money that
he may divide up between himself and his co-player. If the co-player accepts
the allocation, each of them leaves the game with a monetary reward that
corresponds to that allocation. This game classifies as a fairness game
because equal allocations indicate the other’s preferences and leaning toward
punishing unfair behavior. This is even more obvious for the related Dictator
Game in which the player may literally dictate the allocation of the money,
while the co-player can only accept the allocation. Fair offers and the related
replies are colored green, unfair offers and related replies red. Panel (D)
illustrates the Trust Game. This game constitutes an investment or gift
exchange game that can be formally framed as a repeated PD (Binmore,
1987). Initially, players start with a certain endowment. One player then
decides whether to keep his endowment or transmit it to the other player.
The second player then decides to either keep this gift or to send it back to
the first player. Importantly, each time the gift is transmitted its amount
doubles, and hence, both players are best off sending the gift back and forth.
Cooperative decisions are colored green, uncooperative decisions red.
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Most neuroimaging studies in the field have concentrated on
disentangling the functional profiles of brain regions involved in
economic games according to preferences, reward, and decision
behavior. Regarding the relevant inferential cognitive processes,
activity change in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC)
has been linked to the evaluation of longer-term pay-off sched-
ules. Additionally, concomitantly increased brain activity in the
dMPFC, precuneus, and temporo-parietal junction is believed to
reflect the integration of others’ mental states during coopera-
tion (van den Bos et al., 2009). Regarding the relevant intuitive
and affective processes, activity in the ventral striatum, especially
in the nucleus accumbens, and the dorsal striatum (Rilling et al.,
2002; de Quervain et al., 2004) are acknowledged to be related to
the intrinsically hedonic value of mutual cooperation, while the
orbitofrontal cortex has been linked with the desire for revenge
toward unfair partners (Singer et al., 2006; for an overview see
Fehr and Camerer, 2007).
Similarly, the amgydala was observed to be involved in trust
(Bzdok et al., 2011a,b), reaction to unfair offers, and fear of
betrayal (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Moreover, the (dorsal) ante-
rior cingulate cortex and anterior insula in tandem were related
to anticipatory emotions associated with risk evaluation (Chang
et al., 2011) and encountering unfair versus fair offers (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008). Ensuing prepotent emotional
states and behavioral tendencies such as self-regarding prefer-
ences (Fehr and Camerer, 2007) might be over-ridden by top-
down modulation from the dorsolateral and the ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Suzuki
et al., 2011), such as when abiding by social norms (Knoch et al.,
2010) or taking others’ welfare into account.
It is notable that the experimental games employed in neu-
roeconomics are not only useful to set up effective protocols
for the study of cooperation. Rather, the game-theoretic frame-
work also provides analytic solutions that mark choices in these
games in which the payoffs cannot be further improved given
that the other players’ strategies are fixed and provided that the
players are perfectly informed. Interestingly, these equilibrium
solutions sometimes predict human behavior almost perfectly,
for instance in competitive markets, while in other situations,
in particular, during “face to face” interactions, they fail to do
so. This is especially the case for most experiments relying on
the PD, the Ultimatum Game or the Trust Game. While tradi-
tional economic thought would predict self-interest to dominate
decisions in those games, people show robust cooperation in
laboratory and field settings suggesting that social preferences
are equally important in cooperative decision-making (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Colman, 2003; Bacharach et al., 2006; Fehr and
Camerer, 2007; Tuomela, 2007; Camerer, 2008). For example, in
a meta-analysis covering 35 years of experimental work based on
the PD, Sally (1995) concluded that even in so called one-shot
games (with presumable absence of long-term commitments to
the other player), most people exhibit a remarkable tendency to
cooperate.
Modern game theoretical research, however, took this fre-
quently observed mismatch between predicted and actual behav-
ior as an opportunity for refining and extending the classical game
theoretic framework by acknowledging findings from behavioral
experiments. For instance, preference assumptions underlying
the decision models have been modified to fill the gap between
equilibrium predictions and behavioral data. More specifically,
Fehr and colleagues (1999, 2007) proposed a utility function in
the context of human cooperation termed “inequity aversion”
that penalizes inequities in the player’s and their co-players’ pay-
offs. More colloquially, this model assumes that players are only
fully rewarded if the outcomes are fair to both players. This
not only helps to explain why individuals cooperate in one-shot
games but also why they engage in punishing others for unfair
offers. In another derivative of this methodology, clinical popu-
lations were classified by their cooperative biases, which can be
quantified in terms of a given tendency (not) to deviate from the
classical model that is preferring selfish behavior, in other words,
“deviation from deviation.” Recent findings show that Borderline
patients, exhibit difficulties in maintaining a cooperative strategy
as their partners lower their investments (King-Casas et al., 2008),
whereas patients with conduct-disorders exhibit a stronger ten-
dency to defect in social dilemma games (Rilling et al., 2007). In
this sense, Kishida et al. (2010) refer to “game probes” as they
propose to exploit this discrepancy as a quantitative, dimensional
measure in psychiatric diagnostics.
Both cases are pertinent examples of how the systematic mis-
match between classical equilibrium predictions and observed
human behavior promoted qualitative and quantitative models
about the cognitive mechanisms underlying human cooperation.
However, the focus on economic approaches often results in
blurring or neglecting other facets of cooperation. This is espe-
cially true for aspects of social interaction, such as the actual
challenge of successfully executing a jointly intended cooper-
ative action. The following sections aim at summarizing and
integrating research traditions sensitive to these socio-cognitive
dimensions.
BASICS IN JOINT ACTION: COORDINATING BEHAVIOR
AND SHARING TASKS
Besides striving for mutual benefits, another important facet
of cooperation is acting together in form of joint action. This
facet has received considerable attention in behavioral and philo-
sophical research but much less in neuroimaging and economics
(Schilbach et al., 2012). One central proposition motivating joint
action research is that cooperation cannot be reduced to sin-
gle cooperative choices but also relates to concrete multi-agent
activities in which actions are interdependent and in which a
continuous flow of coordination and mutual adjustment is thus
relevant. This is the case for many instrumental activities carried
out in small- to medium-sized groups, such as hunting, cutting
trees, or fighting together against a common enemy. Here, indi-
viduals work together to materialize a common external goal. But
this also holds true for rather cultural activities such as dancing,
singing, or playing board games, where the activity itself consti-
tutes the goal. As a consequence, joint action research aims at
studying how individuals bring about such tasks or playfully act in
concert. This does not imply that those activities cannot be ana-
lyzed by game theory or that decisions play no role in joint action.
This focus rather motivates a research orientation that empha-
sizes details different from those put forward by neuroeconomics,
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namely, implict synchronization tendencies, anticipatory mech-
anisms, motor resonance, common action representations, and
shared intentions. We will suggest in the course of this review
that both perspectives are not necessarily incompatible with each
other.
Despite marked differences regarding the proposed con-
stituents of joint action, current research can be summarized
by the following coarse taxonomy of joint action (Bratman,
1992; Searle, 1995; Tuomela, 2000, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005;
Knoblich and Sebanz, 2008; Pacherie, 2011). First, joint action
implies at least two agents intentionally acting together, that is,
consciously pursuing compatible goals. In cases of mutual task
dependence, this implicates the agents’ ability to coordinate with
each other, mostly controlled automatically and without con-
scious awareness. This mainly includes perceptual sensitivity and
behavioral responsiveness to the other’s actions andmental states.
Second, joint action, in many cases, implicates rather explic-
itly shared mindsets and motivations including specific beliefs,
desires, goals, and intentions. Of note, “shared” emphasizes that
those mindsets and motives can be actively expressed by com-
municative gestures and verbal behavior. This distinction, in
particular, responds to the fact that the reasons for which indi-
viduals act together often significantly differ and may include
full-blown cooperative, but also selfish or simply socially com-
patible but actually private motives. We will address this point in
greater detail toward the end of this review in the section termed
“modes of cooperation and we-thinking.”
In this section, a number of current findings on joint action
predominantly related to “implicit” processes in joint action will
be reviewed, including automatic behavioral coordination and
action co-representations. The next section will tap into the more
explicitly processed facets of joint action by reviewing findings
and concepts from developmental and comparative psychology.
The subsequent three sections will review current neuroimaging
research pursuing rather integrative approaches with regard to the
behavioral and cognitive facets of joint action and cooperation.
A final section will examine recent theoretical contributions from
social philosophy and economics with regard to their potential of
bringing together together the different variants and aspects.
AUTOMATIC COORDINATION OF BEHAVIOR
Research on behavioral coordination in joint action demonstrates
that individuals show a strong propensity to synchronize their
behavior in the presence of others. This can even be observed in
experimental settings thatarehighlyunlikely toelicitexplicit reflec-
tion of mutual actions. For example, Richardson and colleagues
(2007) had subjects sit in front of each other on rocking-chairs.
Those chairs were shaped in a way to bias for different rock-
ing frequencies. Nevertheless, synchronization of the subjects’
rocking frequencies was observed in this scenario. Further stud-
ies prompting individuals to coordinate their behavior explored
cognitive mechanisms for mutual adjustments. In a behavioral
study by Knoblich and Jordan (2003) subjects shared control over
a tracking-device that had to be kept aligned with a horizon-
tally moving object. Crucially, this rather difficult task could not
be achieved individually. The results suggested that individuals
indeed solve coordination problems by anticipating the others’
moves without relying on explicit communication. A joint tap-
ping paradigm extends these findings (Konvalinka et al., 2010):
subjects had to synchronize to external beats or to their partner.
The results suggested that anticipation and adjustment performed
by each individual are necessary but not sufficient for high syn-
chronization performance. Instead, anticipation and adjustment
need to be bidirectional, i.e., mutual, for accomplishing joint
action. First insights into the neural basis of coordination in
joint action were provided by Newman-Norlund and colleagues
(2008). In their fMRI experiment, single and joint action versions
of a virtual lifting task were compared, in which subjects had
to adjust their actions in order to prevent a ball from slipping
off a bar. The results include increased activity in the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG; pars opercularis) and the posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS), which are both believed to be part of
the putative human mirror neuron system (Keysers and Perrett,
2004; Oberman et al., 2007; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007; Schilbach
et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). This has been taken to suggest
that when human actors achieve mutual coordination they rely
on a motor representation of their partner’s ongoing action.
Taken together, these findings shed light on advanced coor-
dination skills that go beyond mere temporal estimation and
prediction as suggested by the individual-joint comparisons.
However, some caution is warranted regarding the temptation
to take these examples as instantiations of mental-state coordi-
nation or full-blown cooperation, as these studies do not permit
any principled conclusions about the nature of the entities coor-
dinated nor the agents’ attitudes toward their acting together. The
following two sections will address these nuances in greater detail.
COMMON ACTION AND TASK REPRESENTATIONS
Despite providing first insights into the cognitive and neural pro-
cesses that underlie joint action, these tasks put special emphasis
on behavioral coordination. Accordingly, insights into the coordi-
nation of mental states in joint action can be drawn from another
set of studies that specifically investigated how people share repre-
sentations of their partner’s actions, that is, how they form action
co-representations. Studies on action co-representation charac-
teristically exploit the so-called Simon-Effect (Simon, 1969). This
effect is elicited in subjects that are asked to respond spatially to
non-spatial features of stimuli while ignoring the location of the
stimulus presentation. Characteristically, in tasks that elicit the
Simon-Effect actual stimulus location affects reaction times. For
instance, when subjects respond with left button presses to green
and with right button presses to red stimuli, they tend to be sig-
nificantly slower when the green stimulus appears on the right
side (incongruent response) as compared to the left side (con-
gruent response). In a seminal behavioral study by Sebanz et al.
(2003) a joint action version of the Simon-Task, also called “inter-
active” or “Social Simon-Task” was established. In their setting,
task rules were distributed among two subjects sitting alongside
each other in order to reduce the tasks to individual go/nogo,
which were performed independently but in parallel. That is, the
task was to respond to certain stimuli, e.g., green ones, but not
to others, e.g., red ones, which are presented at different loca-
tions (left versus right). Importantly, a Simon-Effect (increased
reaction times during incompatible trials) was observed in this
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 148 | 4
Engemann et al. Games people play
joint task as compared to the same task in the absence of a second
actor, indicating mutual co-representation of actions among the
subjects.
In a number of follow-up experiments (Sebanz et al., 2005)
it was demonstrated that individuals co-represent not only their
partners’ actions but also the rules guiding their actions. These
cognitive entities were teased apart by implementing different
tasks for both players, which sometimes necessitated the same and
sometimes necessitated different responses to the same stimuli.
Concretely, one subject had to respond to the direction of a stim-
ulus, whereas the other subject had to respond to its color. The
Social Simon-Effect, that can be regarded as a quantitative behav-
ioral marker for joint action, was markedly stronger when both
tasks required different responses by the subjects. This indicates a
high sensitivity to the partner’s task, even if it was irrelevant to the
subject’s task. Interestingly, the number of neuroimaging studies
that make use of Social Simon-Tasks is still limited. In a replica-
tion of Sebanz’s and colleagues’ study (2003) with concomitant
EEG recordings during a joint action go/nogo task, negative ERPs
in the parietal lobe were observed for the joint nogo as compared
to the single nogo trials (Sebanz et al., 2006). As suggested by the
authors, these findings might reflect intensified inhibitory pro-
cesses in response to the challenge of disentangling one’s own
and the partner’s representations during reciprocally dependent
action. In the same vein, Sebanz et al. (2007), using fMRI versions
of the joint go/nogo tasks (Sebanz et al., 2005), linked increased
activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the ventral
medial frontal gyrus to intensified self-processing during joint
action as compared to individual action.
Taken together, these studies suggest that individuals are highly
sensitive to their partners’ actions and mental states, even when
mutual coordination is not relevant for achieving a given task.
More recent studies following this methodological track suggest
that the set of mental entities that can be tracked using the inter-
active Simon Task is to be extended to the personal relationship
between the actors (Hommel et al., 2009) and cooperative inten-
tions (Ruys and Aarts, 2010; Iani et al., 2011). On the other hand,
the Social Simon-Effect does not involve conscious or explicit
processing of the mental states governing ones partner’s behavior.
Recent findings suggest this effect to be grounded on low-level
saliency mechanisms rather than higher-level representational
processing (Vlainic et al., 2010; Dolk et al., 2011). Capturing the
explicit dimension of cognitive processes subserving joint action,
at least to some extent, requires to permit subjects to interact and
express themselves in a less constrained fashion. The subsequent
section discusses findings from developmental and comparative
psychology highlighting the role of shared intentions and reward
in joint action and cooperation.
JOINT ACTION FROM A COMPARATIVE AND
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE: SHARING INTENTIONS
AND COMMITMENTS
Complementary to the rather implicit processes of adjustment
during joint action investigated above, more elaborate forms of
joint action have been investigated by recent studies (Warneken
et al., 2006; Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Callaghan et al., 2011;
Hamann et al., 2011) from developmental and comparative
psychology. In a study by Warneken et al. (2006) experimenters
tried to engage human-raised adult chimpanzees as well as 18-
month-old and 24-month-old toddlers in shared instrumental
activities and social games. In the former acting together lead
to material rewards, whereas the latter aim at maintaining and
enjoying the shared activity per se. For example, in a typical
instrumental task, food or toys were hidden inside a long tube
with two handles and could only be released by the subjects’
and experimenters’ combined efforts. In contrast, a typical social
game was constituted by a trampoline which the experimenter
and subject could utilize in concert to make a ball jump up and
down. Chimpanzees and children displayed substantial coordi-
nation skills in all instrumental tasks. Contrarily, it was hardly
possible to make chimpanzees engage in social games, which
appeared to be intrinsically rewarding to 18- and 24-month-old
human toddlers. Finally, as activities got spontaneously inter-
rupted by the experimenter, children but not chimpanzees, tried
to reengage the experimenter rather than trying to complete the
task individually or engage in other activities.
This observed effect is noteworthy, as it cannot be attributed
to a lack of cognitive or motor capacities in chimpanzees. Rather,
great apes are likely able to understand others’ goals and even,
to some extent, others’ knowledge (Hare et al., 2001). Moreover,
the example demonstrates that apes are capable coordinators
when food rewards are expected. Comparing instrumental activ-
ities with social games, thus suggests that children, but not
chimpanzees, exhibit an intrinsic motivation to collaborate. The
findings eluded to above also highlight the importance of distin-
guishing games from instrumental activities and demonstrate the
limits of current neuroeconomic approaches relying on instru-
mental payoff in investigating the putative reward mechanisms
underlying cooperation.
Interestingly, when looking at specific social motives that
might explain the observed differences, these seem to go beyond
altruistic helping (helping irrespective of external rewards), which
can be reliably elicited in chimpanzees (Warneken et al., 2007)
and, therefore, is not specific to humans. However, another series
of studies by Gräfenhain et al. (2009) suggests that it might be the
mutual commitment to the joint activity that entails the differ-
ence between chimpanzee and human cooperation. This proposal
is further motivated by philosophical analyses by Gilbert (1990),
Bratman (1992), and Tuomela (2000, 2007) on shared intentions.
The basic idea is that people form joint commitments as they act
together. Hence, they strongly expect each other to fulfill their
respective roles and try to help each other when problems arise
during cooperation. Consequently, if one of the agents interrupts
his participation in the shared task, her partner should not only
be surprised, resulting in updated beliefs about the world, but
should also exhibit disappointment, resentment, and other indi-
cators for normative charge (Rakoczy et al., 2008). The latter may
then encourage attempts to reengage the cooperator, given the
two individuals sharing social commitments to the joint activity.
This line of thought led to the experiments by Gräfenhain
et al. (2009) which were based on social games similar to the
ones from Warneken et al. (2006), which, however, could be car-
ried out either conjointly or individually. In one characteristic
game, child and experimenter sat alongside each other in front
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of a box. The box was equipped with one handle for each of
the two players that sets a rabbit free. That is, the other’s partic-
ipation was not necessary to play the game, and moreover, the
experimental setting allowed taking the other’s role. This experi-
mental detail constitutes a decisive variation of the games used by
Warneken and colleagues that ultimately allowed the researchers
to modulate explicitly the children’s joint commitments while
playing social games. Assuming that joint commitments arise
out of, within and by social interaction, they were varied by
either positively engaging the child before and during the play
(contingent acting, mutual gaze, smiling at the child) versus neu-
trally acting in a rather parallel, unrelated fashion (no contingent
actions, smile not directed at child). In subsequent interrup-
tion periods, around 2-year-old children more often attempted
to reengage the experimenter and less often continued the activ-
ity on their own when playing in the commitment-facilitating
condition compared to the neutral condition. Furthermore, in a
subsequent experiment Gräfenhain and colleagues (2009) nicely
demonstrated that young children anticipate the experimenter’s
expectations toward the child depending on their commitments.
As a second experimenter tried to engage them into a more inter-
esting game, the children displayed leave-taking behavior (e.g.,
signs of inner conflict and at later developmental levels verbal jus-
tifications) in the commitment-facilitating but not in the neutral
condition.
What makes these findings particularly intriguing is, that the
partner, i.e., the experimenter, was not relevant for the task in
an instrumental sense and thus potential “social tool explana-
tions” of the child’s responses to interruption can be ruled out
(see Hamann et al., 2011 for additional behavioral and Callaghan
et al., 2011 for cross-cultural evidence). Besides again highlighting
the importance of social games as a means to access the intrinsic
nature of humanmotivations underlying cooperation, these find-
ings also emphasize the importance of social gaze and contingent
social interaction for establishing joint commitments.
In conclusion, developmental and cross-species research
strongly suggests a unique cognitive and motivational infrastruc-
ture in humans which relies on sharing intentions and forming
joint commitments in order to support cooperative joint actions.
Consequently, specific reward-related and emotional neural cir-
cuits might be expected to be involved. It is to the discussion of
this topic that we now turn.
JOINT ACTION, COMPETITION VERSUS COOPERATION, AND
REWARD
Shared intentions and reward are yet two other critical psycho-
logical entities when contemplating human cooperation. In this
and the following section we will briefly introduce and discuss
findings related to those two concepts in probablymore elaborate
forms of joint action. Neuroscientific research recently started to
investigate the role of shared intentions in joint action, despite the
methodological difficulties that almost naturally arise from inves-
tigating complex notions of cooperation using neuroscientific
methods (Decety et al., 2004; de Bruijn et al., 2009; Newman-
Norlund et al., 2009; Ruys and Aarts, 2010; Koban et al., 2010;
Iani et al., 2011; Radke et al., 2011). One viable approximation
to testing shared intentions in cooperation includes biasing the
participant’s interpretation of a shared activity either toward a
cooperative or toward a competitive setting. This manipulation
can be achieved when modifying the structure of the task, e.g.,
coupling versus uncoupling rewards (de Bruijn et al., 2009; Radke
et al., 2011), designating the one winner who first completes the
task (Becchio et al., 2008), or more directly by instructing the
partner to behave cooperatively versus uncooperatively (Decety
et al., 2004).
For example, in one of Decety’s et al. (2004) fMRI experi-
ments, individuals played a simple board game together with a
confederate, who either tried to help the subjects to complete
the game or tried to block the subjects’ moves. Further, both
conditions were compared to individual game performance. The
contrast comparing joint and individual action revealed increased
activation in the superior frontal gyrus, the superior parietal
lobe and the anterior insula. This pattern of neural activity
might be attributed to higher executive demands of joint activ-
ities for which coordination matters as compared to individual
activities. Additionally, this interpretation is consistent with find-
ings from research on shared action and task representations.
Yet, networks specifically more active during cooperative versus
competitive conditions have also been identified. During cooper-
ation, the medial orbitofrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate, as
well as bilateral anterior insula increased in activity. Consistent
with above mentioned ideas, cooperation might thus be intrinsi-
cally rewarding and might automatically raise expectations about
ones partner. During competition, however, a network includ-
ing the inferior parietal cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex and
the superior frontal gyrus exhibited increased activity. This pos-
sibly reflects that not only cooperation but also competition
encourages mental-state ascription reflecting the strategic aspects
of competition, being a potential link to the game theoretic
paradigms discussed above.
Moreover, the aspect of processing unexpected events during
cooperation, e.g., including errors or interruptions, was, at least
in approximation, singled out by recent neuroimaging studies
that investigated processing one’s own and one’s partners errors
during cooperative versus competitive joint action. In two stud-
ies by de Bruijn and colleagues (de Bruijn et al., 2009; Radke
et al., 2011) subjects played the so-called cannon-shooting game
on a computer, either alone, in cooperation or in competition
with their partner. This game requires precisely aligning a can-
non to hit a given target. Importantly, it was played in such a
way that participants were aware of their own and the other’s
error. Cooperation versus competition was established by cou-
pling versus decoupling participants’ overall outcome based on
their respective performance. The functional analyses revealed
increased neural activity in the MPFC during cooperation as well
as in competition when focusing on the observation of errors
that only affected the other compared to errors that only affected
oneself. This result is interesting in the context of Decety’s et al.
(2004) study, where the same region was associated with compet-
itive processing only. Thus, during joint action the MPFC might
subserve cognition associated with scanning potential threats to
one’s own plans and predicting the other’s behavior, irrespectively
of whether he or she is a competitor or rather an incompetent
collaborator.
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Despite providing valuable insights into intentional process-
ing during joint action, it becomes increasingly apparent that the
neuroimaging studies face considerable problems in teasing apart
intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation in cooperation, as activities
are externally rewarded in most cases. Therefore, the neural sub-
strates of commitment-disclosing behavior during joint action
introduced by Warneken, Tomasello and colleagues as impor-
tant indicators of cooperation (Tomasello et al., 2005; Warneken
et al., 2006; Gräfenhain et al., 2009) still remain unknown (see
Figure 2 for an illustration of the current neuroscientific coverage
of psychological constructs in the context of cooperation).
JOINT ACTION AND REWARD IN THE LIGHT OF JOINT
ATTENTION
A promising contribution to the importance of social gaze and
intrinsic reward in joint action has been made by Schilbach
and colleagues (2009), who instantiated episodes of visual joint
attention during fMRI scanning. The phenomenon of joint
attention has been intensely discussed by Tomasello and col-
leagues (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello and
Carpenter, 2007) as one important example for shared intention-
ality, a bundle of abilities and motivations subserving the coor-
dination and sharing of mental states. These authors proposed
that the evolution of human cooperation and culture critically
depended on the emergence of joint attention. In a large num-
ber of studies, they were able to show that children around their
9th month of age are able to make others follow their own gaze.
Moreover, most children learn to exactly discern what others want
them to attend to when looking at various objects or at compound
objects, which emphasizes the intentional nature of joint atten-
tion (see Carpenter et al., 1998 for an exhaustive treatment of
the topic). Finally, recent research indicates that early joint atten-
tion is even predictive of speech and theory of mind performance
(Aschersleben et al., 2008). Despite its importance, the neurosci-
entific understanding of joint gaze and attention is still limited,
which can be attributed to the methodological challenge of inves-
tigating eye-movements and naturalistic social interaction in an
fMRI environment. In order to establish visual joint attention,
in the experiment by Schilbach et al. (2009) the methodology
was based on an eyetracking algorithm that allows detecting fix-
ations and to adjust stimulus presentation accordingly (Wilms
et al., 2010). This algorithm was then used to control the gaze
interaction between the participant and a fictive confederate rep-
resented by a virtual face, in a way that allowed for capturing
gaze following and, ultimately, joint attention. The neuroimag-
ing analyses suggest an increased BOLD response in the ventral
striatum during joint attention initiated by the participant, as
compared to joint attention initiated by the other suggestive of
an inherently rewarding experience associated with establishing
a shared experience with another person. This was corrobo-
rated by making use of correlation analyses with a postscan
pleasantness rating, which indicated that participants actually
















FIGURE 2 | Current neuroscientific coverage of psychological concepts
related to cooperation. Purely illustrative depiction that demonstrates to
what extent different psychological facets underlying cooperative phenomena
have up to now been subject to neuroimaging-based investigations.
The measures are based on the authors’ subjective impression rather on any
objective measure given general inconsistencies in nomenclature and
diverging experimental settings throughout existing research on
cooperation.
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The results and the scope of this study are particularly inter-
esting for at least two aspects relevant to the topic of this paper.
First, the task involves externally unrewarded activity and thus
the results are in favor of intrinsic rewards driving joint action.
Second, joint attention is likely to involve shared intentions and
can be understood as a very basic form of joint action (Fiebich
and Gallagher, 2012; Pfeiffer et al., 2011). Consequently, and
in line with Schilbach et al. (2012) it can be argued that gaze-
based interaction paradigms constitute a potential keymethod for
integrating comparative and developmental research with social
neureconomics. However, further experiments are needed that
clearly establish hypotheses about the intrinsic reward of joint
attention in ruling out mere contingency or efficacy-experiences
as potential confounds.
To sum up, joint action research elucidates several aspects and
preconditions of cooperation in the sense of acting together; some
of them even tap into mutual helping and support. It demon-
strates individuals’ sensitivity to coordinate, to establish common
representations of their joint activity in cognitive and motiva-
tional terms. Neuroimaging studies complement these findings
and corroborate psychological assumptions regarding the role
of executive functions, reward processing, action mirroring and
mentalizing in joint action. At the same time, it has to be
stated that neuroimaging studies have not yet been able to fully
capture the details revealed by developmental studies based on
interaction-based methodologies. In order to fill this gap, future
neuroimaging paradigms should employ externally unrewarded
social games and include naturalistic interactions that allow for
mutual interventions (reengagement attempts, criticism, teach-
ing, reassuring) as exceptions (interruptions, problems, errors)
arise during joint action. The latter point is of considerable sig-
nificance in unveiling the agent’s motives and experiences that
govern their mutual cooperation, in other words telling to which
extent agents cooperate when acting together. Importantly, this
is not just cosmetic in nature, as comparative studies reveal
distinctions in ape and human cooperation only at this level.
The studies discussed up to this point capture many important
facets of cooperation: striving for mutual benefit, acting together
and supporting each other. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that
the individual pieces of evidence are difficult to integrate with
each other, as the different trends of cooperation research signif-
icantly differ in their underlying key concepts (decision making,
joint action, shared intentionality) and employed methods (game
theory, neuroimaging, action-based approaches). In the following
sections, we will discuss conceptual advances that might help to
remedy this shortcoming.
NEUROECONOMICS REVISITED: STAG HUNT COOPERATION
As was seen above, game theoretic approaches to cooperation
suggest social preferences to guide human decision making in
strategic social interaction including material payoffs. Concretely,
the findings suggest mechanisms that invoke “social” utility func-
tions, thus coupling personal with social welfare and encouraging
cooperative choices by punishment of non-cooperative behavior.
In fact, research on social preferences taps into the motivational
contingencies in human cooperation. Conceptually, social pref-
erences fulfill a similar role as the joint commitments unveiled
by comparative and developmental studies. Both approaches
argue for the intrinsic nature of the mechanisms captured by
their paradigms. Yet, both perspectives suffer from their own
limitations. Also, findings from comparative and developmental
research are difficult to compare to findings from neuroeco-
nomics.
Developmental and comparative approaches convincingly rely
on naturalistic joint action scenarios in which social interactions
during instrumental and non-instrumental activities are com-
pared. Yet, research on social preferences relies on one-shot games
in which the social interaction is reduced to making choices
known to have consequences for the other’s payoff. While the
former seem to deemphasize formal analysis, the latter hardly
seems to capture ecologically valid scenarios (Schonberg et al.,
2011). Studying decision-making using material payoffs thus
seems more comparable to instrumental activities but not to the
games employed by developmental studies. Moreover, in the neu-
roeconomic paradigms used to test social preferences selfish and
social preferences usually form a potential conflict, at least in the
light of the classical game theoretic framework. For example in the
PD, uncooperative choices constitute the only Nash-equilibrium
but are not Pareto efficient, indicating rational options that, if
chosen by all players, would not yield the best possible outcome
for all (Myerson, 1997). Therefore, one may also call these games
mixed-motive games.
This, however, does not hold for most of the joint action
paradigms which may be more appropriately analyzed as com-
mon interest games in which one Pareto superior Nash equi-
librium exists (Bacharach et al., 2006) implicating congruence
between selfish and social preferences, hence, facilitating the for-
mation of shard intentions. One such game is the stag hunt game
that can be traced back to a parable by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in
which two hunters can either conjointly hunt a stag together or
hunt a hare separately. Stags possess considerable strength and,
therefore, hunting them requires successfully combining efforts,
but also is most rewarding. Conversely, hunting a hare does not
necessitate assistance of the other but yields only limited reward,
whereas hunting a stag alone, constitutes the least efficient option
(see Figures 3A,B for a schematic depiction of the strategic inter-
action captured by the stag hunt game). From a cooperative
stance, thus, the essence of this game is to coordinate each other’s
action toward hunting a stag together and only to choose hunting
hares if it is indicated that hunting a stag is unlikely to succeed.
Another way of looking at this game is to regard the stag
choice as payoff dominant, as compared to the risk dominant
choice for hunting hares: players can gather sufficient knowledge
about each other, e.g., by communication or mentalistic reason-
ing, to be confident in opting for the stag. Contrastingly, a lack
of such knowledge would make hunting hares more advisable.
Therefore, proficient stag hunters should be equipped with dis-
tinct abilities to assess the other’s mental states or even establish
shared intentions which should be easier in this strategic inter-
action due to the absence of principled conflict between social
and selfish motives. Interestingly, according to Tomasello and col-
leagues (Tomasello, 2009; Hamann et al., 2011; Rekers et al., 2011)
intensified collaboration, is an essential feature of human cooper-
ation that requires exactly theses capacities. Therefore, typical stag
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FIGURE 3 | The Stag Hunt game and its current neuroscientific
implementation. Panel (A) depicts the stag hunt game in its general form
according to which the following relation holds: A > B ≥ D > C. Panel (B)
gives an example of the stag hunt’s payoff matrix. Panel (C) shows the Stag
Hunt Game as implemented by Yoshida et al. (2008, 2010a,b). Analogous to
the original description by—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the stag yields a
higher reward but can only be caught by both players’combined efforts, that
is, by conjointly blocking the stag (big gray square) from two sides to
prevent its escape. In this implementation of the game, the hares are
realized as stationary objects (small gray squares), referred to as “rabbits.”
This ensures that both players can easily and independently catch them.
Rabbits only yield limited rewards. Additionally, the round is over when a
hunter caught a rabbit. Similar to a board game players take turns moving
their token between fields.
hunt game scenarios, i.e., physical collaboration, presumablywere
of major importance during the evolution of human cooperation
(Skyrms, 2004; Bacharach et al., 2006) and might have paved the
way for the emergence of human’s unique intention-reading and
-sharing aptitude (Tomasello, 2009).
Consequently, paradigms incorporating versions of the stag
hunt game (potentially with different pay-off schedules) might
help to combine the interactive features of Tomasello’s and col-
leagues’ joint action paradigms with the analytic power provided
by game theory.
Neural evidence regarding stag hunt interactions, however, is
currently rather sparse. In a recent fMRI study comparing high-
payoff choices in a stag hunt game and a differently framed but
payoff identical lottery game, Ekins et al. (2012) report signifi-
cantly increased activation in brain regions associated with men-
talizing (pSTS, anterior, and posterior cingulate cortex). These
findings are in support the “social knowledge” account depicted
above and implicate social-intentional processing to support
cooperative decisions in stag hunt interactions. However, the evi-
dence is somewhat limited by the lack of whole-brain analyses.
Moreover, the employed experimental setup largely resembled
typical neuroeconomic paradigms in de-emphasizing the fine-
grained details and interactive aspects common to joint action
tasks.
A novel approach combining the advantages of neuroeco-
nomic and joint action methods has recently been developed
by Yoshida and colleagues in a series of studies (Yoshida et al.,
2008, 2010a,b). Here, the stag hunt parable was implemented
almost literally as a hunting task, in which players move their
respective hunter figure on a labyrinth-like grid to hunt stags or
rabbits (see Figure 3C). Interestingly this implementation of the
game, entails continuous joint action (moving one figure toward
a target) as well as strategic choice (moving toward the rabbit
versus moving toward the stag together with the other). At the
same time, the authors drew on the game theoretic basis of the
paradigm, which lends itself to quantitative modeling. In their
computational model of theory of mind, Yoshida et al. (2008)
aim at explaining the agent’s behavior on a trial by trial basis. The
model assumed that agents employ higher order belief inference
in predicting whether their partner will cooperate, given their
own behavior. Moreover, the model issues a cooperation param-
eter which estimates the probability at which an agent chooses to
hunt a stag. This model was then compared to a fixed-strategy
model which assumes a constant cooperation rate (Yoshida et al.,
2008). Applied to experimental data from the stag hunt paradigm,
in which subjects played the hunting task together with a com-
puter agent, the theory of mind model was significantly more
predictive than the fixed-strategy model. Interestingly, this only
holds for healthy controls but not for subjects suffering fromASD,
whose behavior is better characterized by the fixed-strategy model
(Yoshida et al., 2010a). These results nicely illustrate the synergic
potential of combining joint action paradigms and game theoretic
modeling.
This becomes even more evident, when this strategy is com-
bined with neuroscientific methods. In their event-related fMRI
study Yoshida et al. (2010b) adopted a model-based analysis
approach, which allows for directly regressing the BOLD signal
against the parameters provided by the computational model.
This approach not only allows inference about the brain areas
involved in a given experimental task, but moreover allows to
address hypotheses about the computational operations imple-
mented in those areas. The analyses revealed increased activity in
the rostral mPFC during movements of the computer-agent as
well as the activity in the bilateral ventral striatum. This entices
to speculate that mentalizing and reward processes, respectively,
might be involved in performing the stag hunt game. Put into
practice, the model-based approach allowed for understanding
the activity in the rostral mPFC as a function of uncertainty of
belief inferences and the activity in the ventral striatum as a func-
tion of the outcome. Additionally, increased activity found in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was shown to follow a model
parameter that described how many levels of recursion where
involved when thinking about another agent’s.
The modeling strategy employed in this study convincingly
allows addressing specific hypotheses regarding the nature of the
cognitive processes underlying cooperation and social interac-
tion. Complementary to Yoshida’s ToMmodel, Braun et al. (2009)
have proposed a methodology capable of testing joint continuous
motor activity for Nash equilibrium solutions. Further success
in closing the loop between decision making, motor activity,
and joint action is to be expected from future studies com-
bining and exploiting related methodologies in a neuroimaging
environment.
Interestingly, the neural correlates underlying the payoff and
agent-movement events closely matched those reported for the
self-initiated joint attention episodes from Schilbach et al. (2009).
Although only speculation, this might indicate a common neural
basis subserving stag hunt cooperation and basic social interac-
tions, such as joint attention. This would support Tomasello’s
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(Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2009) assumption of an inter-
nal link between stag hunt cooperation as well as the special
cognitive and motivational capacities, which he summarized as
“shared intentionality.”
Moreover, the stag hunt paradigm might also allow studying
responses to exceptions of the event-flow in the way demon-
strated byWarneken and colleagues (Warneken et al., 2006, 2007;
Hamann et al., 2011); and should thus allow detailing the neu-
ral basis of joint commitments. Concretely, one could investigate
the neural responses to violations of expectation, that is, when
subjects recognize the other’s choice to hunt a hare individually
versus to assume commitment to hunt a stag. Manipulation of
the others’ reputation, sympathy or interpersonal responsiveness
might help creating joint commitments and social expectations.
Although more difficult to control, one might alternatively vary
to what degree the players can communicate (e.g., verbal ver-
sus nonverbal-gaze-based) during the game to study the effects
of communication on stag hunt solutions. Verbal responses to
exceptions might then serve as additional indicators of the under-
lying joint commitments. Thus, if implemented in an fMRI or
a neurophysiological paradigm that elicits, e.g., verbal protests,
this might provide a rather concrete link between the different
construals of cooperation discussed so far.
Figure 4 illustrates the neuroimaging findings from the studies
discussed in the course of this work.
MODES OF COOPERATION ANDWE-THINKING
In this final section we will discuss recent theoretical develop-
ments and demonstrate how they can provide a framework that
permits an integrated view of cooperation at both the behavioral
and the neural level.
The analysis of cooperation by Tuomela (2000, 2007) and
the theory of team-reasoning by Bacharach (Bacharach, 1999;
Bacharach et al., 2006) formulate precise assumptions about the
cognitive architecture and reasoning categories underlying differ-
ent cooperative behaviors. Further, both theoretical approaches
are designed in a comprehensive fashion that allows for a wide
range of applications. In particular, Tuomela (2007) proposed
that cooperation comprises all activities in which agents share and
jointly pursue goals, whether specified as concrete ends involv-
ing high levels of behavioral coordination or as group norms
and ideals that do not exactly specify how to bring about the
implicit common goal. Another important aspect of Tuomela’s
theory is the distinction between “i-mode” and “we-mode” coop-
eration, which refers to the mindset involved in joint actions.
According to this idea, agents might construe their shared activ-
ity as either involving commitment and giving rise to strong
mutual expectations—a stance toward the joint action he terms
we-mode. Or agents might cooperate as a matter of fact while
not sharing psychological attitudes, goals and commitments at a



































































FIGURE 4 | Neural activation patterns observed in neuroeconomic and
joint action imaging studies. The peak locations of the metabolic change
during relevant tasks were rendered on sagittal (A,B), coronal (C) and axial
slices (D) of a T1 single-subject template. The color of the symbol indicates
the publication from which the coordinates were drawn. The shape of the
symbol describes the study category. Coordinates in MNI space.
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shared activity named i-mode. In the i-mode, agents might, for
example, stop cooperating as soon as costs increase.
Concretely, Tuomela argues that both aspects constitute inde-
pendent dimensions yielding a taxonomy that allows describing
the structure of cooperation on a task dimension (dependence
versus independence) and a motivational dimension (individual
[i-mode] versus social [we-mode] commitments). Applied to our
purposes, Tuomela’s theoretical framework allows separating the
different facets of cooperation discussed so far. For example, the
rabbit-game from Gräfenhain’s and colleagues (2009, see above
for discussion) experiments constitute an independent task while
at the same time involving a pronounced we-mode in the joint
commitment condition1. In contrast, in Newman-Norlund’s and
colleagues (2008) virtual-lifting task, which also was discussed
above, the subjects’ tasks are dependent while it remains unclear
whether the subjects operate in a we-mode or in the i-mode.
Consequently, “we-mode” and “i-mode” can be conceived as
mindsets or schemes between which individuals can undulate,
reflecting the ubiquitous fact that humans tend to cooperation
selectively. Based on a comprehensive review of the relevant lit-
erature, Tuomela (2007) further contends that the we-mode is a
uniquely human phenomenon that emerges early in ontogeny (as
indicated by developmental research reviewed above). However,
while models have recently been proposed to incorporate these
ideas into neuroscientific research (Becchio and Bertone, 2004;
Adenzato et al., 2005; Becchio et al., 2006), this has so far
hardly been put into practice. We propose that the we-mode
theory might be a useful concept when it comes to systemiz-
ing cooperation research. Moreover, the specific assumptions of
the we-mode theory are interesting by themselves and might
help to design experiments that systematically tease apart dif-
ferent psychological dimensions constitutive for the wide range
of cooperative phenomena. Whether such a thing as the we-
mode really exists is an empirical question. However, gath-
ering systematic evidence for or against this concept might
help to better understand whether different facets of cooper-
ation discussed in this paper share a common psychological
and neural ground. Conversely, they might also constitute dis-
tinct phenomena that are only associated by conventional use of
language.
The innovative potential of this direction of thought is fur-
ther illustrated by Bacharach’s (Bacharach, 1999; Bacharach
et al., 2006) theory of team-reasoning, which is highly related
to Tuomela’s we-mode theory. Accordingly, thinking can either
operate individually, as analyzed by classical economic thought,
or socially, as described by his alternative game theoretic model
of team-reasoning. When thinking as a team, individuals may
overcome social dilemmas by modifying their frame of reasoning
1This at least holds for the child, whereas, the experimenter’s motivation
underlying his or her play might be due to his individual commitments to
playing a larger paper-writing and publishing game, as kindly pointed out by
one of the reviewers. It has to be added that this larger game can of course
be played in a we-mode, as in the best case the authors constitute a team.
Even competition in a defined game implicates acknowledging the constitutive
rules defining that game (Tomasello, 2009; Searle, 1995) and hence implicates
a minimum of cooperation.
to employing what he calls profile selection: instead of worrying
about the other’s potential lack of cooperation, when thinking as
a team, individuals conceive of themselves as parts of a group and
assume their role in selecting the option that has the highest out-
come profile from the team’s perspective. Moreover, Bacharach
argues, that a skill to team-reason developed during human evo-
lution and constitutes the key capacity underlying cooperative
solutions of mixed-motive games such as the PD and common
interest games as the stag hunt, again, suggesting a common
biological basis for different kinds of cooperation. Moreover,
Bacharach’s theory of we-thinking is ontologically more parsi-
monious as team-reasoning is basically a consequence of framing
which neither requires sophisticated mentalizing nor complex
normative entities (Bacharach et al., 2006; Pacherie, 2011). Such
a theoretical framework thus more easily allows for including
developmental and certain clinical populations lacking full-blown
mentalizing capacities into the family of cooperators and joint
actors.
Taken together, the benefit of a theoretical perspective in
neuroscience acknowledging the notion of we-thinking, as high-
lighted by Tuomela and Bacharach, would clearly provide a
rich framework for cooperation research, whether focusing on
decision making or joint action. Paradigms capitalizing on this
framework may thus constitute a promising direction to assess
behavioral, goal-related, andmotivational aspects of cooperation.
CONCLUSIONS
Human cooperation is a highly complex phenomenon. Hence,
it can and should be viewed from various angles and dis-
sected by diverse scientific disciplines. Anthropological research
emphasizes that social selection pressures have shaped human
evolution and have led to the emergence of cooperative social
systems that appear to be without parallel in the animal king-
dom. Experimental psychology has proposed the concept of
joint action as one paramount aspect of human cooperation,
which refers to the automatic synchronization of behavior during
coordinated action execution. Comparative investigations stress
that sharing mental states during cooperation is more prevalent
in human children than in great apes and altruistic punish-
ment is probably characteristic of human but not non-human
primates. Cross-cultural studies likewise suggest that children’s
capacity and propensity for interpersonal cooperation is an inter-
ethnically stable human trait. Finally, the advances in imaging
neuroscience have begun to allow mapping the neural corre-
lates and brain networks that subserve decision-making during
cooperation tasks.
However, neuroeconomic research on cooperation has so
far been mostly based on a small number of paradigms that
emphasize material payoffs and decision-making, hereby often
disregarding other aspects of naturalistic cooperation. We con-
tend, however, that the stag hunt game, describing a highly
under-researched strategic interaction, lends itself to the inte-
gration of game theory with findings from joint action research
representing the interactive and embedded nature of coopera-
tion. Further progress in this area of research, we hold, will
be made by employing stag hunt paradigms to link decision-
making with other socio-cognitive momentums, such as joint
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attention, gaze communication, intrinsic motivation, and social
commitments. Needless to say, this move does not imply ignoring
the computational andmathematical advances in neuroeconomic
cooperation research. On the contrary, we believe that a model-
based approach which potentially allows for regional mapping
of computational mechanisms, will play an important role in
the development of this field. In this way, (social-) philosophical
and economic proposals for taxonomically categorizing cooper-
ative phonomena might be efficiently tested for neurobiological
pertinence.
Taken together, employing more paradigms based on games
and mutual benefits in neuroeconomics might help to link
up with psychological research on cooperation, to go beyond
mere decision-making aspects during cooperation and to pro-
mote computational modeling in the context of ecologically valid
cooperation-scenarios. The field of neuroeconomics should inte-
grate, and thus, directly profit from the rich scientific legacy of
surrounding theoretical and experimental disciplines in order to
most comprehensively capture human cooperation, and, finally,
establish a truly social field of neuroeconomics.
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